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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
on the net or gross income of an independent contractor has been held
valid although the income is derived from a contract with the government. 15
A tax on bank deposits by the federal government was held valid, although
included therein were deposits of the state.16 A tax on the income derived
by a state from liquor business into which it entered was held valid.' 7 In-
heritance taxes have been upheld on bequests to both the federal and state
governments. 18 A tax on income derived by a person carrying freight,
passengers, and mail by automobile was held valid even though the bulk
of the income was derived from carrying the United States mail.' 9
The tendency in recent years has clearly been to restrict the doctrine
that the power to tax involves the power to destroy 20 and to extend the
competing doctrine that a nondiscriminatory tax which has only a remote
and indirect influence upon the operations of the government should not'be
objectionable. 21 This would seem to be particularly desirable where the
taxes are levied upon the income of private enterprises and only remotely,
if at all, affect the interests and operations of government.
In the light of this recent tendency in the law as well as sound tax doc-
trine, the holdings in the instant cases would seem to be as correct as they
were inevitable. Where they will lead it is not necessary to determine, for
"the doctrine of implied immunity must be practical and should have regard
to the circumstances disclosed." 22 Experience has shown that there is no
formula by which a fortiori a line of distinction between immune and tax-
able governmental agencies may be plotted. L. H. B.
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE PERMITTING APPEAL BY
STATE-[United States].-In a recent case the accused, indicted for first
degree murder, was found guilty of second degree murder. The state, acting
pursuant to a statute' giving it a right of appeal similar to that exercised
Educational Films Corp. of America v. Ward (1931) 282 U. S. 379, 51
S. Ct. 170, 75 L. ed. 400.
15. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell (1926) 269 U. S. 514, 46 S. Ct. 172, 70
L. ed. 384 (net income); James v. Dravo Contracting Co. (1937) 58 S. Ct.
208 (gross income); Comment (1938) 23 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY
280.
16. Manhatten Co. v. Blake (1893) 148 U. S. 412, 13 S. Ct. 640, 37
L. ed. 504.
17. South Carolina v. United States (1905) 199 U. S. 437, 26 S. Ct. 110,
50 L. ed. 261.
18. United States v. Perkins (1896) 163 U. S. 625, 16 S. Ct. 1073, 41
L. ed. 287; Snyder v. Bettman (1903) 190 U. S. 249, 23 S. Ct. 803, 47
L. ed. 1035.
19. Alward v. Johnson (1931) 282 U. S. 509, 51 S. Ct. 273, 75 L. ed. 496.
20. McCulloch v. Maryland (1817) 17 U. S. 316, 4 L. ed. 579.
21. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell (1926) 269 U. S. 514, 46 S. Ct. 172, 70
L. ed. 384.
22. Ibid.
1. Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) sec. 6494: "Appeals from the rulings and
decisions of the Superior Court or of any criminal court of common pleas,
upon all questions of law arising on trial of criminal cases may be taken
by the state with the permission of the presiding judge to the Supreme
Court of Errors in same manner and to same effect as if made by the
accused."
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by the accused, appealed on the issue of the admissibility of certain evi-
dence. The upper court finding reversible error granted a new trial, upon
which the defendant was convicted of first degree murder. The statute in-
volved was challenged as a violation of the "due process" clause2 but was
upheld by the United States Supreme Court.3
The defendant maintained that retrial, even though under the original
indictment, would have amounted to double jeopardy if the federal govern-
ment had been prosecuting the case and that retrial by a state violated
the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In denying this
contention the Supreme Court held that the guaranty against double
jeopardy was not transplanted from the Bill of Rights into the "due process"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court suggested the following
as the proper test to ascertain whether or not such transplanting had taken
place: Is the guaranty the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty?-
does its abolition violate a principle of justice fundamentally, rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people? It is submitted that this is in
reality a restatement of the results of the cases rather than a test. As
previously mentioned, the Court decided that such "double jeopardy" as
here involved did not transgress such a principle.4 The Court, moreover,
pointed out the existence of respectable authority for the proposition that
a retrial upon appeal by the state under the original indictment does not
amount to double jeopardy.5
2. U. S. Const., Amend. XIV.
3. Palko v. State of Connecticut (1937) 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. ed. (adv.
op.) 220.
4. The guaranties in Amendments I-VIII which have or have not been
absorbed into Amendment XIV may be briefly summarized as follows:
(a) As to the constitutional requirement for jury trials (Amendments VI
and VII) the Supreme Court has held that states may modify, abridge, or
abolish jury trials. New York Central R. Co. v. White (1917) 243 U. S.
188, 37 S. Ct. 247, 61 L. ed. 667, L. R. A. 1917D 1, Ann. Cas. 1917D 629;
Wagner Electric Co. v. Lyndon (1923) 262 U. S. 226, 43 S. Ct. 589, 67
L. ed. 961, and cases cited therein. (b) It has been held that an informa-
tion at the instance of a public officer may properly be substituted by the
state for indictment by a grand jury. Hurtado v. California (1884) 110
U. S. 516, 48 S. Ct. 111, 28 L. ed. 232. (c) However, freedom of speech,
the free exercise of religion, the right to be represented by counsel, and the
right of peaceable assembly are protected against state action by the Four-
teenth Amendment. See DeJonge v. Oregon (1937) 299 U. S. 353, 57 S. Ct.
255, 81 L. ed. 278, commented upon in (1937) 22 WASHINGTON U. LAv
QUARTERLY 427; Herndon v. Lowry (1937) 301 U. S. 242, 57 S. Ct. 732,
81 L. ed. 1066; Hamilton v. Regents of University (1934) 293 U. S. 245,
55 S. Ct. 197, 79 L. ed. 343; Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U. S. 45, 53
S. Ct. 55, 77 L. ed. 158, 84 A. L. R. 527. (d) The guaranty that no person
shall be compelled to be a witness againt himself in a criminal case has been
held to be terminable at the option of the state. Twining v. New Jersey
(1908) 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. ed. 97; Snyder v. Massachusetts
(1933) 291 U. S. 97, 54 S. Ct. 330, 78 L. ed. 674, 90 A. L. R. 575. (e) The
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures as afforded by the Fed-
eral Constitution extends only to the Federal government and its agencies.
Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. ed. 652,
L. R. A. 1915B 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C 1177.
5. See the vigorous dissent in Kepner v. United States (1904) U. S. 100,
24 S. Ct. 797, 49 L. ed. 114, 1 Ann. Cas. 655; see also Torno v. United
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss3/14
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
In England, the common law absolutely barred appeals in criminal cases. 6
Subsequently the right of the defendant to appeal after conviction was
established. 7 A similar rule prevails throughout the United States. The
subject of appeals by the state in this country is greatly confused, and the
cases are interspersed with a variety of doctrines. Some jurisdictions pro-
hibit any form of appeal or review at the instance of the state; 8 others,
such as Connecticut, accord the state the same right of appeal as the de-
fendant.9 There is a wide diversity of viewpoint between these two extremes.
In some states the prosecution is allowed to appeal only in the case of
major offenses;' 0 whereas, in others the prosecution may appeal only where
minor offenses are involved." Many statutes authorize the state to appeal
specific issues of law.1 2 Conflicts as to the time at which the state is en-
titled to its appeal, if any, are quite as extensive. Under some statutes, an
appeal by the state may be taken only after final judgment; 1 3 under other
statutes, the state may only appeal before final judgment; 14 while still
others prohibit an appeal after the prisoner has been discharged.1 5 In
several states the prosecution is permitted to conduct moot appeals, in order
to secure a determination of a question of law for future guidance without
affecting the fate of the defendant in the particular case.' 6
The Connecticut statute seems to offer certain advantages. It will clearly
restrict the number of individual miscarriages of justice by allowing ap-
States (1905) 199 U. S. 521, 26 S. Ct. 121, 50 L. ed. 292, 4 Ann. Cas. 773,
involving a Federal statute which provided that no person accused of crime
in the Philippine Islands shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense.
6. Rex v. Wilkes (K. B. 1770) 98 Eng. Rep. 328; 1 Stephen, History of
the Criminal Law (1883) 308; Stephen, General View of the Criminal Law
(2d ed. 1890) 171; Miller, Criminal Law (1934) 536.
7. English Criminal Appeal Act (1907) 7 Edw. VII, ch. 23, sec. 3.
8. State v. Wellman (1919) 143 Minn. 488, 173 N. W. 574; State v.
Johnson (1920) 146 Minn. 468, 177 N. W. 657.
9. State v. Lee (1894) 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110, 27 L. R. A. 498, 48
Am. St. Rep. 202. A comparable Vermont statute was upheld in State v.
Felch (1918) 92 Vt. 477, 105 At. 23.
10. State v. Adams (1920) 142 Ark. 411, 218 S. W. 845; State v. Harri-
son (1923) 154 La. 1011, 98 So. 622; City of Sheridan v. Cadle (1916) 24
Wyo. 293, 157 Pac. 892.
11. Baldwin v. Chicago (1873) 68 Ill. 418; Commonwealth v. Prall (1912)
146 Ky. 109, 142 S. W. 202; Commonwealth v. Gutten (1918) 180 Ky. 446,
202 S. W. 884.
12. For an excellent and exhaustive survey of such statutes see Miller,
Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases (1926) 36 Yale L. J. 486, 488, fn.
11; A. L. I., Code of Criminal Procedure (1930) 1203-1211.
13. State v. Sherman (1918) 144 La. 77, 80 So. 205; State v. Dickerson
(1905) 730 Ohio St. 193, 76 N. E. 864.
14. District of Columbia v. Horning (1918) 47 App. D. C. 413; State v.
Hart (1917) 90 N. J. L. 261, 101 Atl. 278.
15. State v. Aurell (1923) 112 Kan. 821, 212 Pac. 899; State v. Adams
(1920) 123 Miss. 514, 86 So. 337; State v. Kelsey (1922) 49 N. D. 148,
190 N. W. 817; State v. Mun (1920) 71 Wis. 36, 176 N. W. 70.
16. For a discussion elaborating and opposing this view see Hicks, Moot
Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases (1927) 7 Ore. L. Rev. 218.
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peals from improperly procured acquittals.17 It will further tend to foster
a symmetrical and uniform development of criminal law, at least within each
state, by subjecting rulings of every trial court, in favor of the accused
as well as against him, to appellate review. s It has also been suggested
that such a statute will have a wholesome effect on the character of crimi-
nal trials and agencies of law administration and enforcement by subjecting
the conduct of the defense of an accused to the scrutiny of an appellate
court. 9  C. J. D.
LABOR - TRADE UNIONS - LIABILITY FOR VIOLENCE - [Federal]. - The
United Electric Coal Companies secured an injunction in 1935 which com-
pelled the defendant Progressive Mine Workers of America to discontinue
its campaign of violence arising out of the jurisdictional dispute between the
Progressives and the United Mine Workers in the Illinois Coal Fields.1 After
establishing its right to an injunction,2 the plaintiff company filed a motion
for assessment of damages caused by the destructive methods of the Progres-
sives. Held, that all damages suffered by the plaintiff employer as a result
of illegal activities of the Progressives be assessed against the defendant
union.8
It is settled that a union may be held liable in damages for unlawful
boycotts and picketing,4 for causing breach of contract, and for causing a
17. Miller, Appeals by State in Criminal Cases (1926) 36 Yale L. J.
486, 504.
18. See People v. Ah Leo (1915) 28 Cal. App. 164, 151 Pac. 749; State v.
Johnson (1918) 139 Minn. 500, 166 N. W. 123; Alt v. State (1911) 88
Neb. 259, 129 N. W. 432; State v. Lee (1873) 10 R. I. 494; State v. Elder
(1924) 130 Wash. 612, 228 Pac. 1016.
19. Miller, Appeals by State in Criminal Cases (1926) 36 Yale L. J.
486, 506-512. Thus even though a defense attorney may be in contempt and
subject himself to discipline personally, an acquittal of the accused can
not be challenged in absence of collusion on the part of the defendant.
Goodhart v. State (1911) 84 Conn. 60, 78 Atl. 853; In re Cary (Minn. 1925)
206 N. W. 402.
1. An indication of the methods employed in the dispute may be found
in People v. Beacham (1934) 358 II. 373, 193 N. E. 205.
2. Electric Coal Companies v. George Rice et al. (C. C. A. 7, 1937) 80
F. (2d) 1, reversing (D. C. E. D. Ill. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 635.
3. Unreported. The original decree awarded $117,000 damages. A mo-
tion for rehearing, to re-assess damages, is now pending.
4. Shinsky v. Tracy (1916) 226 Mass. 21, 114 N. E. 957, L. R. A. 1917C,
1053; St. Germain v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union (1917) 97
Wash. 282, 166 Pac. 665.
5. O'Neil v. Behanna (1897) 182 Pa. 236, 37 At. 843; R and W Hat
Shop, Inc. v. Sculley (1922) 98 Conn. 1, 118 Atl. 55, 29 A. L. R. 551. How-
ever, certain decisions, notably in New York, permit unions to carry on
activities which in other jurisdictions would be regarded as inducing breach
of contract. The decisions may be distinguished on the ground that the
courts refused to find any contract between employer and employee which
could be broken. See Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin (1926) 216
App. Div. 663, 215 N. Y. S. 753; Interborough Transit Co. v. Green (1928)
131 Misc. 682, 227 N. Y. S. 258. Cf. Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers (1920) 188 Ky. 477, 222 S. W. 1079.
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